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This paper analyzes the welfare effects of funding regulation for defined benefit pension plans subject to pension 
benefit default risk in an incomplete financial markets OLG-setting with aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic 
pension default risk. The financial market incompleteness arises from the inability to trade human capital claims. 
Using numerical methods to solve for equilibrium, we show first that default-free defined benefit pension plans 
are welfare-improving even in a dynamically efficient economy. Second, we show that in the presence of default 
risk funding regulations improve aggregate welfare by making larger size plans more attractive and that full 
funding is not necessarily the optimal policy. Our results provide a rationale for the widespread underfunding of 
defined benefit pension plans and might explain the decline of these plans after the introduction of stringent 
funding regulation in the US. 
 
JEL Classification: H21, H31, H55 
 




*    I would like to thank Dimitris Christelis, Thomas Hintermaier, Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano, Paul 
Sengmueller and seminar participants at the University of Salerno and the University of Vienna for their 
comments. Any remaining errors are my own. Research funding from the European Commission’s Research 
and Training Network “Financing Retirement in Europe” is acknowledged.  
♦   University of Salerno and CSEF.  Contact address: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, 









3.2. Households   
3.3.  DB pension plans and funding regulations 
4. Equilibrium 
4.1 Solution method 
4.2 Calibration of the benchmark economy 
5. Results 
5.1 Measuring welfare 
 5.2 Default-free pension plans 
5.3 Default risk and regulation 
6. Conclusions 
References 
   1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Employer-sponsored deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o np l a n sh a v eb e e na ni m p o r t a n tp a r to f
the compensation package for dependent employees in the US in the last century.
Since the beginning of the 80’s the pension landscape is undergoing a dramatic
change however. Most companies are phasing out wage-indexed deﬁned beneﬁt
plans and the fraction of active workers covered by this type of plan has declined
from 35.3% in 1975 to only 17.5% in 1999. This does not imply that employer-
sponsored pension plans have declined in importance. The fraction of employees
covered by such plans has continued to rise to 56.6% in 1999 from 49.8% in 1975.
But most new plans are of a deﬁned contribution nature, lacking indexation to
future wages and carrying full investment risk like for example private savings
plans. From a risk-sharing perspective, this development is puzzling, since pen-
sion economists have been claiming that precisely because of wage indexation,
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans provide unique risk-sharing opportunities for house-
holds and can help make ﬁnancial markets more complete (Bodie, Marcus, and
Merton (1985)). The underlying reason for these changes is a hotly debated issue
and various explanations have been oﬀered in the literature. One explanation is
based on changes in the distribution of bargaining power between workers and
ﬁrms, making it possible for ﬁrms to shift retirement income risk onto workers
(Besley and Prat (2003)). The proponents of this view argue that ﬁrms proﬁt
f r o mt h em o v et o w a r d sd e ﬁned contribution plans because future proﬁts are less
exposed to longevity or wage risk now. Another argument made, claims that
expected returns to stock market investment have increased relative to expected
domestic wage growth and that households therefore prefer to invest a larger frac-
tion of their wealth in claims on future capital income rather than future wage
income. A third group of researchers (see Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979), Ledolter
and Power (1984)) argues that excessive regulation by the government is at the
root of the phenomenon, pointing towards the 1974 Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) which has introduced tight regulation of deﬁned beneﬁtp e n -
1sion plans and has created a governmental institution enforcing these regulations
(the Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation (PBGC)).
We try to answer the question under which conditions funding regulations for
wage-indexed deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans can be “excessive” and reduce aggre-
gate welfare. For such a situation to emerge, it is a necessary that these plans
have the potential to improve welfare. We argue that incompleteness of ﬁnancial
markets is key to understanding why wage-indexed deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans
are useful ﬁnancial instruments for households. If claims on human capital income
cannot be traded on the market1, the wage indexation feature of deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans implies that these plans can partly substitute for the human capi-
tal asset. This is the source of welfare gains from additional risk-sharing in our
economy. To model aggregate production risk, we assume that the factor share
parameter in our overlapping generations economy is subject to iid shocks as sug-
gested by Merton (1981). Since we are taking a general equilibrium perspective
in our analysis, deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans are modeled primarily as an institu-
tion that provides intergenerational risk sharing, abstracting from the role of these
plans as tools of corporate governance. Consequently, deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans
are assumed to be contracts between ﬁnitely-lived households and inﬁnitely-lived
ﬁrms, paying a ﬁxed fraction of the working generation’s income as a beneﬁtt ot h e
retired generation. We introduce pension default risk through exogenous default
on pension payments and a corresponding reduction of contribution payments to
the beneﬁt of working generations2. Despite being relatively stylized, our setup
is not tractable analytically due to the incomplete markets assumption and the
heterogeneity among agents. This feature of OLG—models with aggregate risk and
agents living for more than 2 periods is well-known since Huﬀman (1987). We
1It is beyond the scope of the paper to explore the reasons why human capital income cannot
be traded on the market. Straightforward reasons would be legal restrictions or moral hazard (see
Hart and Moore (1994)).
2Clearly, these modeling choices sweep under the rug many interesting and important issues at
the ﬁrm-level such as proﬁt-sharing arrangement between employees and shareholders or capital
structure and ﬁrm default risk implications of pension plan investments. A general equilibrium
perspective however, requires a relatively high level of abstraction and while being stylized, we
feel that we still capture the main characteristics of real-world deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans.
2therefore apply numerical methods to solve for equilibrium and evaluate welfare
in the economy.
We show ﬁrst that in the our model, the introduction of default-free wage-
indexed deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans increases welfare even if the economy is
dynamically eﬃcient. This ﬁnding illustrates that in our economy deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans provide unique risk-sharing opportunities that allow households to
reduce their consumption risk in retirement. Further, we ﬁnd that upon introduc-
ing pension default risk and funding regulation, a positive relation between the
average size of DB plans and the desirability of funding regulation emerges. Fund-
ing regulation makes larger size DB plans more attractive and in this sense can
promote intergenerational risk-sharing while simultaneously reducing consumption
risk in retirement. We also ﬁnd that the optimal policy does not necessarily require
full pre-funding of beneﬁts however. This is because regulatory bodies deciding
upon their policies should take into account aggregate welfare measures rather
than the welfare of a subset of the population only. In our setting this implies that
regulation should take into account the adverse eﬀects on dynamic productive eﬃ-
ciency as well as the risk-reducing eﬀects on retirement consumption. Clearly, any
measures that regulators may take to decrease the probability of ﬁrms defaulting
on promised pension beneﬁts without aﬀecting the welfare of future generations
should be taken. Funding regulations however do aﬀect savings and productive
eﬃciency and should therefore be used more cautiously. Requiring that promised
pension beneﬁts are fully covered by long positions in tradable ﬁnancial assets in
all states of the world, turns out to reduce the expected rate of return on these as-
sets in our model and distorts savings and investment decisions by households and
ﬁrms. Rather than requiring full funding always, we ﬁnd that the optimal rate of
funding that should be required from companies providing wage-indexed deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans should depend on the average size of these plans and the
probability of pension default, which might imply both, substantial underfunding
or overfunding depending on preferences and technology.
3The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, we relate
our methodology and results to the existing literature and then we present the
model and describe our method to approximate the equilibrium. Our main results
are presented in section 5, followed by concluding remarks.
2L i t e r a t u r e
We are not aware of other papers in the literature studying regulation of deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans in a general equilibrium context with heterogeneous agents,
aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, and incomplete markets. In this sense, we also
make a methodological contribution here. The idea that wage-indexed deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans can provide intergenerational risk-sharing by creating a new
type of ﬁnancial asset, originated in the work of Merton (1981) and Bodie, Marcus,
and Merton (1985). Merton (1981) studies the complete markets case of a version of
our GE-model and shows that a system of taxes and transfers resembling unfunded
social security can reestablish the complete markets allocation even if claims to
human capital are not traded on ﬁnancial markets. In their thorough review of
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans in the U.S., Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1985) claim
that: “DB plans create implicit securities that can be welfare improving and which
are not now available in capital markets and which might not be expected to be
created in capital markets. Some examples of these “securities” are factor-share
claims, price-indexed claims, and perhaps deferred life annuities at fair interest
rates.” Our paper can be seen as an attempt to make this point more rigorously
and study the implications of funding regulations within such a model.
There is an extensive literature on the shift from DB to DC plans in the last
twenty years. Ross and Wills (2002) discuss the theoretical issues involved in the
choice between DB and DC plans from the point of view of both ﬁrms and employ-
ees. Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979) discuss the implications of stringent funding
regulations for DB plans on ﬁrm behavior. They predict that stringent funding
rules might lead to a decline of those plans. Cocco and Lopes (2004) and Huberman
4and Sengmueller (2004) study empirically the choice of pension plan type by em-
ployees. They ﬁnd that households seem to self-select into the individually rational
choice of pension plan, but that choices made are inﬂuenced also by options made
available by employers. The economic literature has also produced arguments for
the existence of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans which we view as complementary to
the argument for the existence of DB plans we use. Ippolito (1985) argues that DB
plans emerge because they serve to decrease employee turnover when portability
of pension rights is not ensured, while Lazear (1981) ﬁnds that they provide in-
centives which reduce moral hazard through their deferred compensation property.
The systematic “underfunding” of DB plans has also attracted quite some
attention in the economic literature. Cooper and Ross (2002) argue that ﬁrms
would underfund pension plans in a world of imperfect ﬁnancial markets. Their
credit constraints assumption provides a rationale for both, why DB plans exist
and why they will be underfunded. We focus on missing markets rather than
borrowing constraints and take a general equilibrium perspective, but our results
concord with those obtained by Cooper and Ross (2002). The classical papers
studying the implications of individual ﬁrm DB plans on sponsoring company
ﬁnance and investment were written by Sharpe (1976), Black (1980) and Tepper
(1981). Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) and Webb (2004) analyze the optimal
funding policy of a pension plan in dynamic stochastic models allowing for ﬁrm
default. Besley and Prat (2003) apply the insights of capital structure theory to
the design of single ﬁrm pension plans. All of these papers focus on the ﬁrm level
and assume complete ﬁnancial markets. Their predictions for the optimal funding
of these plans is therefore not surprising: optimal behaviour of ﬁrms requires that
they are fully funded in order to not expose employees to default risk. Given the
empirical evidence on underfunding, we conclude that the assumption of perfect
ﬁnancial markets may be inappropriate here.
Our methodological approach is based on results from the literature on com-
5putation of equilibrium with incomplete ﬁnancial markets. Krueger and Kubler
(2004) show how equilibrium can be computed in economies with overlapping
generations and aggregate risk. In Krueger and Kubler (2002) they evaluate the
gains from intergenerational risk sharing in an incomplete markets context, apply-
ing their methods to the case of the introduction of social security in the United
States in 1934.
3E c o n o m y
Our economy is a simple overlapping generations economy in which each genera-
tion is of size 1 and lives for 3 periods. There is a single perishable good in the
economy which can be used for both investment and consumption. There is no
other technology for converting installed capital goods back to the output good
other than the production technology.
3.1 Production
The single output good is produced by a large number of identical ﬁrms charac-
terized by a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to





There are three arguments in the ﬁrms’ production function: it−1, investment in
period t−1 which equals the capital stock installed in period t, nt, the labor input
purchased by ﬁrms, and θt, the labor share realization in period t.T h ef a c tt h a t
it−1 enters the production function directly implies that there is full depreciation
in each period. The factor share parameter of the production function, θt,i s
subject to iid shocks. We assume that the random variable θt c a nt a k eo naﬁnite
number of values and that the distribution of θt, Ψ(θ), is constant over time with
3The equilibrium allocations would be given by the same set of equations, if we would allow
for productivity growth and scaled all variables by the current level of technology.
6mean E [θt]=α. These assumptions deﬁne a ﬁnite-state Markov chain, Θ,w h i c h
captures the stochastic process for θt. Product and labor markets are assumed
to be competitive and the ﬁrm chooses labor inputs after having observed the
shock realization. Investment becomes productive only with a one period delay.






wt =( 1− θt)iθt
t−1n−θt
t (3)
The fact that uncertainty enters the model through stochastic variation in ag-
gregate factor shares needs some motivation, since the standard assumption in
macroeconomics is that factor shares are constant over time. It turns out that
recent empirical evidence shows that factor shares did ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly over
the last 40 years in developed countries. While the US and Canada had the most
stable factor share series of all OECD-countries in the period 1960-2000 and even
in those countries factor share varied by a few percentage points. This empirical
fact is documented by Blanchard (1997). Jones (2005) proposes a model based
on search and embodied technological change to explain the ﬂuctuations, while
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue for a wage bargaining model. We follow
Merton (1981) and assume that some exogenous factor drives factor share changes
directly which is consistent with both arguments. Since the period length in our
OLG-model is about 20 to 30 years, we assume that these shocks are iid over time.
3.2 Households
All generations share the same time-separable preferences over the single consump-
tion good, are endowed with hs units of labor at age s and do not discount the
future. Since all households within a generation are equal, consumption is indexed
only by the time period in which it occurs t and the superscripted age of the
7household 0, 1,o r2. There is no bequest motive, lifetime is deterministic and
households do not have a ﬁnancial endowment when they are born. The objective




















Age 0 households are born without assets and their budget constraint is simply
c0
t = h0wt − s0
t+1 (5)
where s0
t+1 denotes the savings of age 0 agents carried over from period t to period
t+1. At age 1 households born in period t earn (pay) interest, rt+1, on their initial
savings (borrowings) and save some amount s1
t+2 to ﬁnance future consumption.
Their budget constraint therefore reads
c1
t+1 = h1wt+1 + rt+1s0
t+1 − s1
t+2 (6)
At age 2, households do not have a labor endowment, they simply collect the




Financial markets are incomplete in the sense that human capital cannot be traded
in the market. Households are therefore not able to insure fully against the sys-
tematic risk originating from the factor share ﬂuctuations. If human capital would
be tradable, age 0 households could sell their future labor endowment, ﬁnance
their consumption and invest the resulting savings optimally in both physical and
human capital claims. Age 1 and 2 households would derive their income from
both, human and physical capital, and as a result risk-sharing within the economy
would be optimal (see Breeden (1979) for necessary conditions for optimal risk
sharing). Apart from aggregate output risk, agents would be able to diversify all
8income risks and each generation would consume a ﬁxed fraction of output. This
result has been shown by Merton (1981) for the log-utility case. If claims on hu-
man capital are not tradable, the marginal rates of substitutions of all generations
alive cannot be equalized through trade and risk-sharing is therefore suboptimal.
All generations have to bear additional consumption risk.
3.3 DB pension plans and funding regulations
Once we have obtained the functions describing the equilibrium path of the aggre-
gate economy, we ask whether there exist potential welfare gains from risk-sharing
among households. In particular, we consider the case of ﬁrms oﬀe r i n gad e ﬁned
beneﬁt pension plan to its employees. We introduce DB plans exogenously, assum-
ing that ﬁrms and households agree on such an arrangement and treat the size of
the DB plan as a parameter of the economy. The DB plan requires employees to
pay a fraction τ of wages into a pension fund. Retirees receive beneﬁts paid from
the fund which are proportional to the going wage rate.
The consumption risk-reducing feature of our deﬁned beneﬁt plans is that they
are indexed to wages since the missing ﬁnancial market in our economy is the
market for claims on human capital. When deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans link
retirement beneﬁts to current and future wages by deﬁning beneﬁts as a fraction
of total wage income received adjusted by the change in wages from period t to
period t +1 , they provide a payoﬀ that is equivalent to the payoﬀ of a claim on





where bt+2 are the beneﬁts paid to the generation born in period t. If there is no
default risk, this beneﬁt rule implies that a completely unfunded plan is ﬁnancially
viable. The generations of age 0 and 1 always ﬁnance through their contribution
payments exactly the beneﬁts to be paid out to the current retiree generation. In
9the absence of funding regulations, we assume that ﬁrms and households prefer
this ﬁnancing arrangement.
If default is possible, deﬁned beneﬁt plans no longer provide only additional
risk-sharing possibilities by acting like a claim on human capital, but also introduce
additional risk to retirement consumption - pension default risk. We incorporate
pension default risk by assuming that only a fraction δ of households actually
receives the promised pension claims. For a fraction 1 − δ of households, the pen-
sion fund does not have any funds to pay out the pension beneﬁt and retirement
consumption has to be ﬁnanced by private savings only. Households learn about
the default realization only when they are about to claim their beneﬁts, but they
anticipate that default is a possibility and adjust their consumption policies ac-
cordingly. We assume that the pension beneﬁts not paid out to workers are not
lost, but are used to reduce the pension fund contributions by the working genera-
tions. Note that since there is a continuum of households, the default risk washes
out in the aggregate.
One way to reduce the risk to retirement beneﬁts created by the possibility of
default and an accompanying reduction in contribution payments is to require the
ﬁrms to pre-fund the expected retirement beneﬁts. This route has been taken by
the US government in the 1970’s and it is a hotly debated issue in Europe how
strict such funding regulations should be. While obviously the debate on optimal
funding regulations is just one aspect of a larger problem - which is the optimal
provision of retirement income in general - we focus on the funding issue since our
model allows for a concise formulation of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan funding and
its impact on beneﬁts, contributions and proﬁts.
Our modeling of pre-funded pension plans assumes that each ﬁrm runs its own
pension fund and that neither the ﬁrm nor the fund have problems in accessing
the capital market. Funding regulation is modeled parametrically as the fraction
of pension payments which is secured against pension plan default by pre-funding.
10Our full funding benchmark is the amount of retirement beneﬁts that each ﬁrm
would have to pay in the worst-case scenario (the highest possible realization of re-
tirement beneﬁts). Given our assumptions on the production function and beneﬁt
rules, the maximum level of beneﬁts in period t +1is given by












where ¯ θ is the lowest possible realization of the proﬁt share. Funding regulation
chooses a parameter λ which requires each ﬁrm to pre-fund at least a fraction λ








We implement this by assuming that the pension plan is funded only through
contributions by the working generation and that ﬁrm proﬁts are not aﬀected
directly. There is an indirect eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts in our formulation, because the
assets of the fund are reinvested in the ﬁrms, increasing the capital available for
production in the next period.
s0
t+1 + s1
t+1 + ft+1 = it (11)
The positive eﬀect of pre-funding is that in case of default the beneﬁts of retirees are
at least partially secured. We assume that the retirees actually have a claim on the
entire fund in case of default which explains why they get the entire fund in case of
default in 15. Contributions of the working generation are adjusted in each period
to ensure that the pre-funding requirements are exactly met. They are reduced
in period t by the amount of contributions that are not paid to retirees due to
pension plan default, (1 − δ)τwt and they are increased by the diﬀerence between
the required pre-funding for all plans and the amount of pre-funding available from
surviving pension plans. This formulation implies that all contributors are treated
equally and that no intertemporal linkages exist between pension plan defaults
11and the expected retirement beneﬁt for a given household. After each period,
all pension plans divide up the existing assets and demand contributions from
each contributor which exactly fulﬁll the pre-funding requirement. The budget
constraints with default risk and funding regulations read:
c0
t = h0 (wt − δτwt +( ft+1 − δrtft)) − s0
t+1 (12)
c1


















and the distribution of the random variable δi is iid across households and time
and such that each household with probability δ receives the full beneﬁt( δi =0 )
and with probability 1 − δ it receives only the pre-funded portion (δi =1 ). Now,
we deﬁne an equilibrium in this economy and describe our procedure to solve the
model.
4 Equilibrium
Following Krueger and Kubler (2004) we deﬁne a recursive equilibrium of this
OLG-economy which takes the distribution of capital holdings as the endogenous
state space. In the economic literature, these equilibria are referred to as “Func-
tional Rational Expectations Equilibria” (FREE), a terminology introduced by
Spear (1988). We describe the endogenous state space by a two-dimensional box
deﬁned by lower and upper bounds on the aggregate capital stock, it−1,a n dt h e
share of capital held by age 1 households, µ0
















and the representative ﬁrm, {nt}, and a set of competitive prices,





, the following conditions
hold at all periods t =0 ,...,∞






, maximize the household’s
utility subject to the budget constraints and given equilibrium prices {rt,w t},
2. the representative ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts,
nt ≡ argmaxnt [Ft − wtnt] (16)
3. aggregate savings equals aggregate investment, s0
t+1 + s1
t+1 + ft+1 = it,
4. the labor market clears, nt = h0 + h1,




t + it = Ft (17)
The Euler equations relevant for the computation of equilibrium which in this

























where Et is the expectations operator with respect to the factor share realiza-
tions and Ed
t is the expectations operator with respect to the joint realizations
of factor share and pension plan default.
134.1 Solution method
An analytical solution for the equilibrium in this economy is not available. We
therefore approximate the equilibrium by means of a computational procedure
which solves the system of equations deﬁning the equilibrium at a ﬁnite number
of points and uses function approximation techniques to determine equilibrium
choices oﬀ the grid. The recursive structure of the problem allows us to focus on
a single system of equations despite the inﬁnite number of periods for which this
economy exists.
The method we use to solve the system of equations has been introduced by
Judd (1992) and termed the computational method “a projection algorithm”. The
key idea in this approach which is extensively discussed in Judd (1997) approximate
the equilibrium decision rules of the household by a ﬁnite-dimensional polynomial
deﬁned by a vector of unknown coeﬃcients and solve the system of equations at
a predetermined set of points. We denote the approximate policy rules for ages 0












where ξ is the vector of coeﬃcients
deﬁning the approximation. The number of points at which the Euler equations are
evaluated and solved is equal to the number of coeﬃcients of the policy functions to
be determined. In order to implement this procedure we need to deﬁne a ﬁnite grid
on an appropriate endogenous state space on which the approximating functions
are deﬁned and the system of equations is solved. As mentioned above, we use a
2-dimensional box, B, as our endogenous state space and deﬁne G gridpoints on
t h i ss p a c e .T h ee n t i r es t a t es p a c ei sj u s tt h ep r o d u c ts p a c eo ft h eg r i do nB and
the state space of the ﬁnite-state Markov chain, Θ. The precise deﬁnition of the
system of equations, Λ, that we use to solve for the functional rational expectations
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((1 − δτ)wt − δrtft) (22)
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= τwt+1 + (23)
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an appropriate basis of functions
must be chosen. Judd (1992) recommends orthogonal polynomials as an appropri-
ate basis and we opt for using a tensor product base of Chebyshev polynomials. We
c h o o s et h es a m ed e g r e eo fa p p r o x i m a t i o nk in both dimensions of the endogenous
state space and therefore use the set of basis functions
T ≡ {Ti (x)Tj (y)|0 ≤ i ≤ k,0 ≤ j ≤ k}
where Tn (x) denotes the n-th degree Chebyshev polynomial evaluated at point x.
The chosen gridpoints in each dimension of the endogenous state space correspond
to the k +1zeros of the degree k +1Chebvyshev-polynomial.
Starting with an initial guess for the policy functions, one can solve the Euler
equations at the grid points through the use of a non-linear equation solving proce-
dure for multidimensional functions. The solution procedure determines the vector
of coeﬃcients for the policy functions at which the system of equations is exactly
fulﬁlled. In this procedure it is important to start with a good initial guess, be-
cause convergence is not likely when the initial guess is far from the solution. The
iterations over the approximation of the policy functions stop when the coeﬃcients
of the approximating functions do not change by much anymore. The resulting
consumption rules deﬁne the equilibrium policy function of households at age 0 and
1. Together with the budget constraints and the market-clearing conditions they
deﬁne the approximate equilibrium of the economy. The importance of the initial
15guess for the convergence of the algorithm described above requires a “continua-
tion method” for solving the system of equations for an arbitrary set of parameter
values. Starting from the solution of a simple case without uncertainty and log-
utility for which an analytical solution exists, we move to the solution of the model
by gradually increasing the amount of uncertainty and the degree of risk-aversion
of the utility function. A single solution step with a good initial guess requires
approximately 1-2 minutes computation time on standard Desktop-PC running
MATLAB.
4.2 Calibration of the benchmark economy
To solve numerically for the equilibrium of the economy, we have to specify the
functional form of the utility function and choose values for the parameters. We
follow standard practice and choose power utility with the relative risk aversion
parameter equal to 2. The only other parameters we need to specify are the labor
endowments h0 and h1, the vector of possible realizations θ and the transition
matrix M of the stochastic process of the factor share. We assume that labor en-
dowments are constant and sum to 1, implying h0 = h1 = 1
2. In order to limit the
dimensionality of the system of equations to be solved, we set the number of pos-
sible theta realizations to 3 and derive the values of the transition matrix and the
realization vector from a discretized normal distribution with mean α =0 .3 and
standard deviation σθ =0 .03, choosing one standard deviation as the interval on
the grid for θ. This results in a vector of possible realizations θ =( 0 .27,0.3,0.37)
and a transition matrix with equal rows given by m =( 0 .274,0.452,0.274).A p -
proximation errors of the Euler equation are of the order exp(−7) already with a
total of 25 basis functions (k =4 ).
The dynamics of the capital stock do not display long-run ﬂuctuations since
there is complete depreciation in each period and the population of households is
renewed after 2 periods. There is still considerable variation in the factor share,
the capital stock and the consumption of households due to the factor share shocks
16however. The discrete nature of the factor share process and the absence of persis-
tent dynamics imply that the capital stock realizations of the next period depend
heavily on the current realization of the factor share shock. Figure 1 illustrates
this
Figure 1: Capital stock dynamics
5R e s u l t s
All simulations reported in this section are based on the equilibrium policy func-
tions that have been computed according to the procedure described above. In
order to be able to do the welfare comparisons, we ﬁrst ﬁx a sequence of realiza-
tions, ˆ θ, of the random variable θ and an initial condition,
³
ˆ ı−1, ˆ µ0
0,ˆ θ0
´
,t h a ta r e
used for all simulations.
5.1 Measuring welfare
Since the focus is on ﬁnding optimal policies in this paper, we need to compare
equilibrium allocations across diﬀerent policy regimes. To do this, we need a suit-
able measure of welfare and opt for a standard criterion: the certainty equivalent of
17consumption giving average expected utility at birth in the stationary equilibrium
of the economy. This criterion is adequate for a long-run perspective of regula-
tion, but does not take into account the transition to the stationary equilibrium,
which might be an important issue in designing real-world policies. Formally, we























where ζ is a draw of the state variables out of the stationary distribution of the
economy and π(ζ0|ζ) and π(ζ00|ζ) are the corresponding 1-step and 2-step transi-
tion probabilities from state ζ to states ζ0 and ζ00, respectively. The we compute
the certainty equivalent CEΦ as CEΦ = u−1 ¡
EUΦ¢
. To obtain the stationary






realizations that we hold constant throughout all simulations. We initialize the
simulation at the midpoint of the box B for the endogenous state variables and
then compute the realizations of all variables for the entire simulation horizon
T + 100. The transition to the stationary distribution is rapid in this economy
because of the absence of serial correlation in the exogenous state variable and
little persistence in the distribution of capital stocks due to the ﬁnite horizon and
full depreciation. Therefore after cutting out the ﬁrst 100 periods, we are almost
sure to have reached the stationary distribution and expected utility is then cal-
culated as the average of expected utility over T − 2 draws out of the stationary
distribution.
5.2 Default-free pension plans
If ﬁnancial markets were complete and agents were able to trade human capital
claims, risk-sharing among generations would be perfect and consumption shares
of output allocated to each generation would be constant. Default-free deﬁned
18beneﬁt pension plans in this setting could not improve risk-sharing anymore and
would only aﬀect welfare indirectly by aﬀecting dynamic productive eﬃciency, not
by changing the consumption allocation given available resources. This result was
shown by Merton (1981), but breaks down, if ﬁnancial markets are imperfect. The
equilibrium consumption allocations show considerable variability, if ﬁnancial mar-
kets are incomplete. Figure 2 displays the relative deviations from the mean share
of total output allocated to consumption of each age group.The graph shows that
Figure 2: Deviations from mean consumption shares
the age group mostly aﬀected by the inability to trade human capital is the gener-
ation of retirees. The consumption share allocated to them varies a lot more than
those of the generations in working age. The middle generation is best insulated
against factor share shocks, since this generation holds a diversiﬁed portfolio of
human and physical capital. The young generation holds human capital only, but
can self-insure against factor share risk by adjusting savings. The retired genera-
tion is exposed the most because they hold capital assets only and cannot adjust
savings anymore. Quantitatively, these deviations can be quite large reaching up
to 15% of the mean consumption share which amounts to about a 3−4% share of
total output.
19Introducing default-free deﬁned beneﬁt plans in this setting reduces consump-
tion share variability primarily for the retired generation and in this sense improves
intergenerational risk-sharing. The deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan provides the age
group of retirees with a substitute for human capital claims and enables them to
hold a more balanced portfolio. The portfolios of the working generations are not
aﬀected that much, since the young still hold human capital only, and the mid-
dle ages already held relatively well-diversiﬁed portfolios in the previous solution.
Figure 3 displays the variability of consumptions shares if the parameter govern-
ing the size of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, τ, is set to 0.15. The reduction in
Figure 3: Consumption share variability with DB plans
consumption share variability for the old is clearly visible. from the graph, al-
though the retired generation still remains the most aﬀected by ﬁnancial market
incompleteness. In fact, there is an optimal size of default-free DB pension plans
which induces optimal intergenerational risk sharing. The overall welfare eﬀects of
default-free deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans do not only depend on the variability of
consumption shares, but also on how they aﬀect dynamic productive eﬃciency of
the economy. Krueger and Kubler (2004) claim their numerical results suggest that
production eﬀects often overcompensate the consumption variability eﬀects and we
20also ﬁnd evidence for this. In fact, the more ineﬃcient the dynamic allocation of
p r o d u c t i v er e s o u r c e si s ,t h em o r ep o s i t i v ea r et h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of default-free
pension plans. Financial market incompleteness does imply however, that even
in an economy with optimal dynamic allocation of productive resources, welfare
c a nb ei m p r o v e db yi n t r o d u c i n gd e f a u l t - f ree pension plans. Now, we explore the
consequences of allowing for default on pension beneﬁts and discuss the welfare
eﬀects of funding regulation in this context.
5.3 Default risk and regulation
Allowing for default on the deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o np l a n sm u s tl i m i tt h ew e l f a r e
gains that can be obtained from introducing them, because additional consumption
risk is introduced by the default risk. Although households can partially self-insure
against the default by accumulating larger private savings, the overall eﬀect must
be negative. The surprising ﬁnding is that quantitatively, the reduction in welfare
is not as large as one might expect. This ﬁnding is illustrated by Figure 4 which
shows a welfare index, computed as the ratio of the certainty equivalent of a given
parametrization with respect to the certainty equivalent of the no DB plan case,
that varies with the average size of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan and the default
probability of these plans. Default-free plans with a contribution rate of about 5%
increase welfare by about 1,3% in our calibration. DB plans larger on average than
about 10% of wages actually reduce welfare due to their negative eﬀect on dynamic
productive eﬃciency. Allowing for default on plans of the moderate sizes analyzed
here does not aﬀect these results qualitatively. Even with a 15% default probability,
which seems unreasonably large considering the frequency of actual default on
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, welfare is still improved by the introduction of these
plans by about 1,1%. The optimal size of the plans is actually increasing in
the default probability since households partially insure against the default risk
by accumulating larger savings and this eﬀect on dynamic productive eﬃciency is
oﬀset only by a larger plan size. These results suggest that in a standard calibrated
21Figure 4: Default probability and welfare
OLG economy with imperfect intergenerational risk-sharing, wage-indexed deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans robustly improve welfare as long as they are of moderate size.
It should be noted however, that an important restriction of our model is that
there is no heterogeneity among households of one generation at all. Our results
therefore only apply of the assumptions necessary for the representative individual
to represent the whole population are valid within one generation. Generalizing
the model to allow for substantial wealth or preference heterogeneity has so far
not been possible for computational and theoretical reasons although some papers
have made attempts to ﬁnd approximate solutions for these types of models (see
Krusell and Smith (1998) or Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)).
Even if the welfare consequences of moderate default rates on deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans appear to be small, we now want to ask whether funding regula-
tions are able to improve welfare in the presence of default risk. We try to answer
that question by again comparing expected utilities across diﬀerent economies, ab-
stracting from transitory eﬀects. The analysis uncovers a positive relation between
the average size of DB pension plans and the desirability of stringent funding reg-
ulation documented by Figure 5. The ﬁgure contains graphs of our welfare index
varying with the average size of DB plans, DB plan default probability and the
22required funding ratio. For small size plans, funding requirements do not increase
Figure 5: Welfare eﬀects of funding regulation
welfare, since households are able to relatively eﬃciently self-insure against default
of these plans and because the eﬀect on dynamic productive eﬃciency is negative.
As the default probability increases, welfare is somewhat reduced however. As the
fraction of retirement consumption ﬁnanced by DB plans grows, funding regula-
tion becomes more desirable and can actually increase welfare substantially with
respect to the unfunded case. If default probability is high, larger funded plans
achieve higher utility than smaller unfunded plans. With a 5% default probability
f o re x a m p l et h ei n c r e a s ei nw e l f a r eb ym o ving from an optimal size unfunded plan
to an optimally funded plan twice as large amounts to a 0.1% increase in certainty
equivalent consumption. Funding regulation therefore increases welfare by making
larger size plans more attractive and households beneﬁt from having larger size
plans. There are two separate eﬀects of funding regulations which make this pos-
sible. The ﬁrst is that funding regulation reduces the risk in retirement income
by providing insurance against default, the second eﬀe c ti st h a ti no u ri n c o m p l e t e
markets economy, funding regulation aﬀects also the dynamic productive eﬃciency
of the economy. We do not ﬁnd however, that requiring full pre-funding of deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans is the optimal choice of regulators. In fact, in our calibration
substantial underfunding is optimal from a long-term welfare perspective. There
23are also cases however, in which overfunding would be optimal. The important
consideration for regulators is that not only the insurance aspect of funding regu-
lation, but also the production eﬃciency aspect needs to be considered.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have analyzed the long-run welfare eﬀects of funding regulation for wage-
indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plans with positive exogenous default probability in an
OLG-economy with incomplete ﬁnancial markets and aggregate risk. The ﬁnan-
cial market incompleteness results from the assumption that claims on human
capital cannot be traded among agents. Aggregate risk emerges from iid shocks to
the factor share. In this economy, default-free DB plans provide a particular type
of ﬁnancial asset which improves intergenerational risk sharing and welfare even
if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. The reason is that primarily the retiree
generation cannot hold well-diversiﬁed wealth portfolios in the absence of tradable
human capital claims. DB plans provide a substitute for such claims and improve
the portfolio allocation of households. With positive default probability, DB plans
also introduce additional risk to consumption however, and funding regulation is
useful to oﬀset these risks. A positive relation between the average size of DB
plans and the optimal funding requirement for DB pension plans emerges. This
relation emerges from two eﬀects: ﬁrst, the higher the fraction of consumption in
retirement ﬁnanced by the DB plan, the larger the beneﬁt from funding regulation;
second, the funding regulation aﬀects dynamic productive eﬃciency positively, if
DB plans are large. The optimal funding regulation however is not necessarily the
one that requires full pre-funding of DB pension plans. In our calibration, sub-
stantial underfunding is actually the optimal policy for plans of moderate average
size. In other cases, also overfunding might also emerge as the optimal policy.
The important consideration for regulators is that not only the insurance aspect
of funding regulation, but also the production eﬃciency aspect needs to be con-
sidered. Interpreting the results of our analysis and applying the model to recent
24US experience, these ﬁndings might explain why a large part of deﬁned beneﬁt
plans is underfunded and why deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans have declined in the
US as stringent funding regulation aﬀected negatively the welfare of households
given the size of these plans. The analysis also suggests that if regulation is not
able to aﬀect the average size of DB plans, it should attempt to improve welfare
by directly reducing the default probability of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans and
choose funding requirements appropriate for given average size of DB plans. If in-
stead the government is able to regulate both the size of DB plans and the funding
requirement, the optimal regulatory policy would be to have large size plans with
substantial overfunding. This policy would eliminate both sources of ineﬃciency
in the economy, the insuﬃcient intergenerational risk-sharing and the dynamic
ineﬃciency in production.
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